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ABSTRACT
Despite significant growth and development in recent years, Islamic banking (IB) 
continues to face widespread criticism due to its apparently weak social outcomes. This 
study investigates the social performance of Islamic banking in Indonesia, including its 
justification as an IB objective and the means of improvement. We surveyed 506 current 
and potential Islamic banking customers across six Indonesian provinces, combined 
with in-depth interviews with 10 Islamic banking experts consisting of regulators, 
practitioners, Sharia scholars, and academics. The findings strengthen previous results 
on the topic in that 42.89% of respondents consider that IB in Indonesia is socially 
defensive (doing the least that is required in terms of social outcomes), while 6.92% 
believe that it is reactive (doing less than that required). Of the remaining respondents, 
34.78% consider the social performance as accommodative (doing all that is required) 
and 15.42% see it as proactive (doing more than is required). Most respondents (52.96%) 
suggest improvement by combining corporate social responsibility and the ZIS (Zakat, 
Infaq, shadaqah)-Waqf system. Only some (7.11%) suggest the establishment of Islamic 
social banking, whose main feature would be to design an alternative to collateral so 
that low- and middle-income customers could more readily access bank financing. We 
recommend that regulators and practitioners take action to address these challenges 
through incentives and long-term strategic planning.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Islamic banking (IB) is theorized to be socially responsible (Asutay & 
Harningtyas, 2015; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007), IB appears to have no particular 
concern when it comes to actual implementation. Some even suggest IB only has a 
trivial effect on disadvantaged people (Asutay, 2007, 2008; Mohd Nor, 2016), while 
others claim IB focuses on profit seeking as much as conventional banks (Abdul-
Baki & Uthman, 2017; Abdul-Rahman, Latif, Muda, & Abdullah, 2014). 
In an attempt to enhance IB’s social achievements, Dusuki (2008) suggest a 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) approach. In addition, the implementation 
of CSR would increase the response of IB in dealing with environment impacts, 
creating social benefits, and encouraging positive initiatives. As an alternative, 
Raimi, Patel, and Adelopo (2014) recommend combining CSR with the waqf 
(Islamic endowments) and zakat (Islamic compulsory charity) systems. Using two 
different simulation cases, Shahimi, Mohd Marzuki, and Embong (2013) argue 
that cash waqf contributes to alleviating poverty by up to 50% in Malaysia. More 
profoundly, however, other studies propose the establishment of Islamic social 
banking (ISB) as a response to the apparent failure of IB in delivering its purported 
social outcomes (Asutay, 2012; Mohd Nor, 2016). After conducting surveys and 
interviews with the stakeholders of Islamic banks in Malaysia, Mohd Nor, Rahim, 
and Senik (2016) suggest a social banking (SB) model could be incorporated in the 
day-to-day practices of Islamic banks and thereby enhance their social contribution.
Our study differs from previous research (Asutay, 2012; Dusuki, 2008; Mohd 
Nor et al., 2016; Raimi et al., 2014; Sairally, 2007) in a number of ways. First, this 
study could potentially be the first known attempt to consider the establishment 
of Islamic social banking in Indonesia. Second, while previous studies (Dusuki, 
2005; Mohd Nor et al., 2016) employ only traditional survey methods using either 
handwriting surveys or emails, we used both a drop-off and online surveys, 
in conjunction with an initial pilot survey to improve accuracy of the final 
questionnaire. Third, also unlike existing work, our questionnaire uses a seven 
point Likert scale for the responses, as opposed to not five, which we believe 
not only more suited to electronic distribution (Finstad, 2010), but more reliable 
(Colman, Norris, & Preston, 1997) and with more justifiable findings (Preston & 
Colman, 2000). Such distinction should help guide future research in related areas. 
Fourth, unlike existing research that surveys only particular stakeholder groups, 
we included all of IB practitioners, regulators (Bank Indonesia, the Financial 
Services Authority, and the National Syari’ah Board) and academics. Such a method 
should yield better and more reliable findings. Last, unlike Mohd Nor et al. (2016) 
who recommend the internalization of social banking within an Islamic bank, we 
make the case for it as a separate and distinct business entity. 
In Indonesia, the idea of establishing or internalizing SB principles in IB has 
thus far received little attention. However, this is perhaps only a matter of time, 
because the banking regulator has now newly committed itself to sustainable 
finance and sound banking, both socially and environmentally (OJK, 2015). To 
inform these developments, this paper investigates four primary questions. First, 
what is the social performance of IB in Indonesia? Second, should IB in Indonesia 
place a greater emphasis on the social dimension? Third, what is the preferred 
scenario to improve the social performance of Indonesian IB? Finally, what 
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products and services would be preferred were ISB established in Indonesia? 
We conduct a survey, and further inform the results through interviews with IB 
experts. 
This paper contributes to the literature at least in three ways. First, we provide 
an empirical assessment of the social outcomes of IB in Indonesia. Second, we 
discuss the options available to improve the social outcomes of IB. Third, we 
highlight the possible characteristics, services, and products of an ISB were it to be 
established. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a literature 
review, Section 3 the methodology, Section 4 the findings, Section 5 the conclusion, 
and Section 6 the recommendation. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. IB Social Objectives 
In relation to social objectives, Islamic scholars divide into two opposing groups 
on the role of social objectives in Islamic banking. A relative few believe that 
Islamic banks should be permitted to operate as normal business entities as long 
as their operations comply with Sharia (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001; Satkunasegaran, 
2003). In contrast, most Islamic scholars consider that Islamic banking should aim 
to support and encourage an economic system aimed at promoting a just, fair, 
and balanced society (Ahmad, 2000; Naqvi, 2016; Siddiqui, 2001). In doing so, 
any economic interaction in society is to “…increase the sum of public happiness, 
whilst reinforcing social solidarities and strengthening their values” (Tripp, 2006, 
p. 119). Similarly, (Al-Zuhayli, 2003, p. 250) stated “…the primary goal of Islamic 
financial institutions is not profit-making, but the endorsement of social goals of 
socio-economic development and the alleviation of poverty.” 
To implement such values, Islamic banks should include the important tenets 
of compliance in their daily activities, and place an emphasis not solely on financial 
profit, but also justice and societal obligation (Taqi-Usmani, 2002). Furthermore, 
Islamic banking is expected to be more socially responsible than conventional 
banks (Asutay & Harningtyas, 2015; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). As a result, Kamel 
(1997) argued that Islamic goals should include objectives relating to economic 
development, the creation of value-added, more exports and fewer imports, job 
creation, the rehabilitation of the incapacitated, and the training of others. 
To date, this strong view of the social responsibility of Islamic bank has 
found legislative support in just a few countries, including Indonesia and Jordan 
(Hamidi & Worthington, 2017). In evidence, the Republic of Indonesia Bylaws No. 
21/2008 on Islamic Banking Acts explicitly encourages Islamic banks to perform 
social functions. In comparison, Banking Law No. 28/ 2000 in Jordan requires that 
Islamic banks not only provide banking services, but help revive social solidarity 
and provide qardh al-hasan (benevolent loans) for the public interest.
2.2. Actual Social Outcomes of IB
According to Wood (1991) social outcomes comprise, for instance, social impact, 
programs, and policies aimed to recognize social concerns of stakeholders. In this 
regard, social outcomes can be described as a realization of IB’s social objectives 
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(Figure 1). For instance, alleviating poverty is part of social outcome, as the 
realization of disbursing zakat fund to support this goal illustrates the point. 
Figure 1.
Social Objectives of IB and Its Realisation (Social Outcomes)
Theological Support
(Qur’an and Hadist)
Social Objectives
Promoting a just, fair,
and balanced society
Social Outcomes :
• Alleviating poverty
• Addressing social welfare
• Promoting social values
• Commitment ﬁnancing
 sustainable project
• Unlawful transaction
Indicators:
• Disbursing Zakat
• Late payment penalty for
 social beneﬁts
• Qard al-hasan (free-
 interest loan)
• Transparancy
Legal Support
(Government regulation or
Law)
Source: Hamidi and Worthington (2017)
Scholars investigate IB’s social outcomes from various perspectives such 
as CSR, ethical identity, and social reporting. Maali, Casson, and Napier (2006) 
employed a disclosure index method to assess 29 Islamic banks in 16 countries 
and reveal that social reporting is much less than that expected, with only those 
banks paying zakat demonstrating consistently good social disclosure. Elsewhere, 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) examined the ethical identity of seven Islamic banks 
and find that these failed to meet the ideal Islamic ethical identity in at least four 
dimensions: commitment to society, disclosure of corporate vision and mission, 
role in managing zakat, charity, and benevolent loans, and top management 
information. In other works, Kamla and G. Rammal (2013) used in-depth content 
analysis to investigate the social reporting (through annual reports and websites) 
of ten Islamic banks and reveal that these banks appear to commit little to helping 
eradicate poverty or strengthening social justice in society. Lastly, Mallin, Farag, 
and Ow-Yong (2014) employed samples of 90 Islamic banks across 13 countries, 
finding that the banks paid rather less attention to the environment than expected, 
while Amran et al. (2017) compared the CSR of Islamic banks in Indonesia and 
Malaysia and show progress in both countries, mostly to do with the workplace 
and community.
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2.3. From SB to ISB
While most banks keep their commitment to social dimensions through a 
consistently applied corporate social responsibility model, other banks emphasize 
their strategies on social achievement. These banks are well known as social 
banking (SB). Guene and Mayo (2001, p. 1) defined “Social banking as where the 
supplier of financial services take a positive interest in the social outcomes and 
effects of their activities”. Alternatively, Cornée and Szafarz (2014, p. 361) simply 
contended that SB is “financial intermediaries paying attention to noneconomic 
(i.e., social, ethical, and environmental) criteria”. Some researchers use the term 
“green banking” (Biswas, 2016; Kaur, 2016), “ethical bank” (Chew, Tan, & Hamid, 
2016; Paulet, Parnaudeau, & Relano, 2015; San-Jose, Retolaza, & Gutierrez-Goiria, 
2011), a “sustainable bank” (Korslund & Spengler, 2012), or an “alternative bank” 
(Butzbach & von Mettenheim, 2015).
No matter how varied the name seems, yet essentially, it comprises triple 
bottom line principles. Such principles were introduced by Elkington (1997) in his 
seminal book Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business, 
in which he suggested businesses should not only include economic, but also 
social and environmental factors to assess its performance. The parameters later 
on became popular as triple bottom line (TBL) principles and were sometimes 
described using other terms, such as profit, people and planet (3Ps) (Slaper & 
Hall, 2011; Vanclay, 2010). In banking industry, the 3Ps as can be seen from the 
Figure 1, Panel (a) are adopted as the principle of social banking (Benedikter, 
2011; Cornée & Szafarz, 2014; De Clerck, 2009; San-Jose et al., 2011; Weber, 2014). 
Hamidi and Worthington (2017) stated that in fact all these criterions appear in 
IB, with different emphasis. For instance, IB considers both financial and social 
outcomes are equally important, although in reality financial matters prevail 
(Hassan & Bashir, 2003). Unlike conventional banks, IB has unique services such 
as zakat and qard al-hasan, with both schemes having the potential to empower 
the poor. Hence, IB is a parallel to “people”. In regards to environment, many 
verses in the Qur’an, the Holy Scripture for Muslim, explicitly advocate people to 
keep and preserve their nature although in reality it seems to be ignored in favor 
for profitability (Hamidi & Worthington, 2018). The addition P for “Prophet” as 
suggested by (Hamidi & Worthington, 2017, 2018) refers to the central role of the 
Prophet as God’s messenger in account that all his thoughts can be applied as an 
ethical guidance for IB. The 4Ps, later titled the quadruple bottom line (QBL), are 
just one proposed framework for establishing ISB (Figure 2, Panel b). 
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Table 1 shows the central differences in term of business model, product 
and services, and credit policy between SB, IB, and ISB. Some SB practices may 
be internalized within ISB, such as exposing transparency, e.g., customers may 
know where fund collected are distributed and designing flexible collateral, 
e.g., an alternative system to provide productive access to credit. Furthermore, 
encouraging the financing of social, ethical, and environmental projects is a 
priority (Hamidi & Worthington, 2018). 
(a) (b)
PLANET
PEOPLEPROSPERITY
PLANET
PROPHET
PEOPLE
PROSPERITY
Source: Hamidi and Worthington (2018)
Figure 2.
From Triple Bottom Line (3P) to Quadruple Bottom Line (4P)
SBs IBs (de jure) IBs (de facto) ISB
Business model
Profit-making, but 
parallel optimization of 
social added value
Mixed, financially and 
socially acceptable
Tend to focus on profit-
making rather than 
social motive, with 
exception on zakat and 
qard al- hasan channels
Mixed, financially and 
socially acceptable, 
with emphasising on 
waqf-zakat-qard al-hasan 
system
Products and services
Focus on banking basics: 
Saving collection and 
credit distribution
Focus on common 
banking service, with 
special attention on 
profit-loss sharing 
projects
Mostly replicating 
conventional bank 
financial engineering 
tools. Profit-loss sharing 
in many cases are trivial
Focus on common 
banking service, with 
special attention on 
profit-loss sharing 
projects
Credit policy
Based on triple 
bottom line analysis 
(environmental, social 
and financial)
Islamic ethics system 
encourages IB to adopt 
triple bottom line 
analysis
Financial outcome 
(single bottom line) 
mostly adopted as 
measurement.
Adopting quadruple 
bottom line principle 
(prosperity, people, 
planet, and prophet)
Source: Hamidi and Worthington (2018) extended.
Table 1.
Comparison among SBs, IBs, and ISB
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III. METHODOLOGY
Researchers have employed various paradigms according to the nature of their 
research. To begin with, Kuhn (1996) defined a paradigm as “the set of common 
beliefs and agreements shared between scientists about how problems should be 
understood and addressed”. There are different competing paradigms such as: 
positivist/post-positivist, interpretive-constructive, critical, pragmatic worldview, 
and postmodern/post structural (Creswell, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Tracy, 
2012). Therefore, the fittest paradigm to be applied for the research needs to be 
discovered. On the other hand, positivist researchers believe that the truth about 
something they observe already exists and only needs their investigation to find 
it (Tracy, 2012). In contrast, interpretivist (or constructivist) scholars suggest that 
reality is not something easily explained in a statement. Instead, the creation 
of knowledge is constructed and produced through intense interaction and 
practices facilitated by the inquirer (Tracy, 2012). Both positivist and interpretivist 
paradigms have their strengths and weaknesses, which at first glance seem 
irreconcilable (Lin, 1998). Instead of using one of these paradigms, Roth and Mehta 
(2002) suggested combining the two approaches because by using the combination 
a better understanding may be generated. 
We will employ two paradigms simultaneously in order to obtain a deeper 
understanding and better results. We intend to apply a pragmatic paradigm to 
address the research for several reasons. First, pragmatism is associated with 
mixed methods research, providing the researcher with a flexibility to use all 
suitable methods (Creswell, 2009). Second, this combination of approaches tend 
to provide deeper understanding and more generalizable findings (Neuman, 
2014). Third, it enhances and strengthens research results (Amaratunga, Baldry, 
Sarshar, & Newton, 2002). Fourth, we can minimize the disadvantages that may 
occur, because the strengths of one method offset the weaknesses of the other. 
Following this, we employ a sequential explanatory design, as shown in Table 2. 
Phase 1 employs a quantitative approach through conducting a survey to capture 
the perceptions of IB stakeholders in terms social outcomes, while Phase 2 uses a 
quantitative approach to scrutinize some relevant ideas about the social dimension 
of IB and the idea of establishing ISB. 
Table 2.
Sequential Explanatory Design of the Research
Phases Description/source
Phase 1: Quantitative Approach 
• Conducting a survey for Islamic banking in 
term of social outcomes
• Drop-off survey in 5 provinces
• Online survey
Phase 2: Qualitative approach 
• Conducting in-depth interview
• Exploring the idea of Islamic social banking
• Purposive sampling
• In-depth interview
• Experts from many backgrounds
• Regulators (BI, OJK, DSN)
• Practitioners
• Academics
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3.1. Data Collection and Analysis
The data was collected through a drop-off survey (a questionnaire send to 
respondents so that they were able to complete the questionnaire at workplace 
or home) and an Internet survey. Unfortunately, as the survey design was for a 
self-administered questionnaire, there was no opportunity for the research team 
to explain or clarify questions from the respondents. To overcome this problem, 
we distributed an online pilot test from 21 November–29 December 2017. This 
experimental survey participated by 137 respondents was to ensure that the 
respondents easily understood all questions. Based on this pilot test, a new 
questionnaire was developed and distributed in five provinces in Indonesia, i.e., 
DKI Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central Java, and DI Yogyakarta. Out of 420 sets 
of questionnaire distributed, as many as 274 were completed, resulting in a 65% 
response rate. All five provinces were well represented in terms of the conduct 
of Islamic banking in Indonesia, as they account for 46% of offices and 65.25% of 
businesses and customers. The number of respondents for each province is shown 
in Table 3. As far as the online survey from 1 February–1 March 2018 is concerned, 
245 respondents participated, which in total yielded 519 responses. However, 
only 506 were usable for the analysis. Non-probability convenience sampling, 
commonly used in banking research was implemented (Kumar, Tat Kee, & Taap 
Manshor, 2009; Pikkarainen, Pikkarainen, Karjaluoto, & Pahnila, 2006; Poon, 2007). 
The questionnaire survey draws on previous studies in the area of IB (Dusuki, 
2005; Gait & Worthington, 2015; Mohd Nor et al., 2016; Zakaria, 2014). The 
questionnaire comprises close-ended questions using multiple-choice questions 
and responses on a seven-point Likert scale. The questionnaire investigates three 
main investigations: (1) the characteristics of respondent demographic profiles, 
i.e., gender, age, province, religion, education, occupation, and income, (2) 
perceptions of current IB social outcomes and any possible improvements, and (3) 
the characteristics of ISB, including preferred products and services, if applicable. 
Data were analyzed descriptively and evaluated within the Kruskal-Wallis 
framework, which is to identify whether independent samples have identical 
distribution or they have differences between groups (Schlotzhauer, 2007).
In addition to the survey, we also analyzed verbal and personal interactions 
based on face-to-face interviews to obtain more detailed information from the 
respondents. Data were transcribed and coded into various themes. We used 
NVivo 12 to generate patterns and visualize data into meaningful tables and 
graphs.
3.2. Sampling
Table-3 provides the descriptive statistics of respondents. More males (59.9% or 
303 participants) than females (40.1% or 203 people) participated in the survey. 
39.7% participants were between 26–35 years, while 25.1% 36–45 years old. 19% 
were 18–25 years old, 13.6% 46–55 years old, and 2.6% more than 55 years old. 
Most respondents lived in West Java (34.2%), followed by DKI Jakarta (19%), 
DI Yogyakarta (17%), Central Java (12.5%), Outside Java (8.5%), Banten (4.5%), and 
East Java (4.3%). Most respondents from Yogyakarta, Central Java, and Banten, 
which encapsulated almost one-third of the population, were associated with 
Islamic Rural Banks catering for small and medium enterprises. 
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 5, Number 2, 2019 245
As expected, nearly all (99%) respondents were Muslims, while the rest 
Catholics (0.6%) and Protestants (0.4%). In terms of education, most were relatively 
well educated, with 44 participants (8.7%) holding a college diploma, 299 (59.1%) a 
bachelor degree, 96 (19%) a master’s degree, and 16 (3.2%) a doctoral degree. Only 
47 participants (9.3%) had primary or secondary education. 
As far as occupational status is concerned, 40.7% respondents were employees 
(others), while 15.6% managers/executives, 10.5% professionals, 8.3% academics, 
7.9% merchants’/business owners, 7.5% government employees, 6.1% students, 
2.8% housewives, 0.4% farmers, and 0.2% unemployed. The majority of 
respondents were of lower income level, with monthly income ranging from less 
than IDR 2,000,000 (13.2%) and between IDR 2,000,001 (40.9%) and IDR 5,000,000, 
while 21.9% participants were of the middle income level, and 12.8% upper middle 
income. The remaining 11.1% of respondents were of high income level. 
In terms of Islamic banking, most respondents (72.3%) had an account in both 
Islamic and conventional banks, while the remainder (36.8%) was customers only 
of Islamic banks. The primary relations were as depositor (36.8%) or depositor 
and practitioner (31.6%), followed by depositor and borrower (17.6%), depositor 
and academic (3%), depositor and regulator (1.8%), depositor and Sharia adviser 
(0.6%), depositor and stockholder (0.4%), and general community (8.3%). 
Table 3.
Profile of Respondents
Characteristics N %
Gender Male 303 59.9
Female 203 40.1
Age 18-25 96 19.0
26-35 201 39,7
36-45 127 25.1
46-55 69 13.6
Above 55 13 2.6
Province DKI 96 19.0
West Java 173 34.2
Banten 23 4.5
Central Java 63 12.5
DIY 86 17.0
East Java 22 4.3
Outside Java 43 8.5
Religion Islam 501 99.0
Catholic 3 0.6
Christian 2 0.4
Education Primary/Secondary School 47 9.3
College Diploma 44 8.7
Bachelor Degree 299 59.1
Master Degree 96 19.0
Doctoral Degree 16 3.2
Other 4 0.8
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The participant interviews were obtained from the population through multi-
stage or clustering procedures. As such, we first identified clusters, e.g., related 
organizations or institutions. We then searched for the individual names within 
the clusters. Last, we sampled the targeted names (Creswell, 2009). Samples were 
collected using purposive sampling, aiming at targeting relevant interviewees 
to answer the research questions (Bryman, 2016) . The interviewees came from 
various backgrounds, including a regulatory body, such as Bank Indonesia, OJK, 
DSN, practitioners, and academics. Table 4 lists the respondents. 
Characteristics N %
Occupation Manager/Executive 79 15.6
Professional (Lawyer, Accountant, Doctor etc.) 53 10.5
Academics 42 8.3
Merchant/Business owner 40 7.9
Government employee 38 7.5
Farmer 2 0.4
House wife 14 2.8
Student 31 6.1
Unemployed 1 0.2
Other (employees) 206 40.7
Income Below IDR 2,000,000.00 67 13.2
IDR 2,000,001.00 - IDR 5,000,000.00 207 40.9
IDR 5,000,001.00 – IDR 10,000,000.00 111 21.9
IDR 10,000,001.00 - IDR 20,000,000.00 65 12.8
More than IDR 20,000,001.00 56 11.1
Bank Account Islamic and conventional bank 366 72.3
Islamic only 140 27.7
Role Depositor only 186 36.8
Depositor & borrower 89 17.6
Depositor & practitioner 160 31.6
Depositor & Syariah adviser 3 0.6
Depositor & regulator 9 1.8
Depositor & Academia 15 3.0
Depositor & Stockholder 2 0.4
Community (non-above) 42 8.3
Table 3.
Profile of Respondents (Continued)
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Responses on Delivering Social Outcomes
As discussed, scholars have had different opinions on the way IB responds to 
social outcomes. On the one hand, they tend to liberate IB to be a normal business 
entity for pursuing profit. To illustrate, IB shall not use a considered amount of 
shareholder’s fund to be used for social activities, because it might jeopardize the 
bank (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001; Satkunasegaran, 2003). On the other hand, many 
have suggested IB to deliver social outcomes, because this issue is inseparable and 
important for IB as its focus is on pursuing profit. 
From the survey, respondents seemed to go with the second opinion (Table 
5). Most respondents (48.2%) agreed and (24.5%) strongly agreed suggesting 
IB shall actively take part on social activities, because this is an essential part of 
its philosophical foundation. The majority of respondents (46.4 agree and 34.6 
strongly agree) believe by conducting their social agenda will strengthen the 
status of the bank. Another interesting point, the majority of participants (45.3% in 
strongly agreement and 36.8% agreement) seem to insist that IB had a better social 
result than conventional banks. 
Table 4.
List of Interviewees, their Institutions and Positions
No Institution Respondent Code Positions
1 Regulator R1 Senior Researcher
2 Regulator R2 Director
3 Islamic commercial bank R3 President Director
4 Regulator R4 Deputy Director
5 Regulator R5 Syariah Advisor
6 University R6 Senior Lecturer
7 Islamic commercial bank R7 Commissioner
8 Islamic Rural Bank R8 President Director
9 Islamic commercial bank R9 Syariah Advisor
10 Islamic Business Unit R10 Director
Table 5.
IB Stakeholders’ Perception on Delivering Social Outcomes
Items
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Islamic banks should not abandon 
delivering social outcomes because it is a 
part of its founding philosophy
1.2 3.4 3.8 14 4.9 48.2 24.5 5.61
Doing social outcomes will strengthen 
reputation of Islamic Banks
0.8 0.8 1.2 7.9 8.3 46.4 34.6 6.00
Islamic banks should show higher social 
results than conventional banks
0.4 0.2 1.4 9.7 6.3 36.8 45.3 6.13
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Further explanation from the Kruskal–Wallis test (Table 6) suggests that all 
three questions statistically insignificant (Asymp. Sig. > 0.05) indicates that there 
are no differences in perception among the different stakeholders’ role. In other 
words, almost all of respondents have voiced the similar opinion on the essence 
of delivering social outcomes for IB. They expect IB will do such a task better than 
the conventional bank. Yet, from the perspective of interviewees, they differ in 
defining what social aspects of IB are included. Some of these following statements 
illustrate the point.
 “Social finance includes ziswaf [zakat, infaq, sedekah, waqf) in which the 
institution has a capacity as amil (collector of zakat) as well as nazhir (managing 
of waqf).” R1
 “The so-called social is more to allowing deprive people to have equal 
opportunity to restore in many ways, for instance financing to help 
infrastructure. The IB’s commercial goal is at around 90%, while the remaining 
is for social purpose.” R2 
 “Social function in the form of baitul mal institution, receiving funds from zakat-
waqf, grants, or other social funds, and channeling them to zakat management 
organizations.” R4
 “The social part of the bank is when we can create opportunities. Why are we 
using opportunity? That opportunity, if I say the opportunity, we talk about 
lead the middle class, we got a lot in Indonesia. However, when we talk about 
low segment, they do not have a chance. We take that way women as our 
priority. First, we select productive poor women then we provide training. 
This is very important; empowerment is very important.” R7
Table 6.
Kruskal-Wallis tests: Respondents’ Responses on IB’s Social Outcomes
Questions Role N Mean 
Rank
Asymp. 
sig. (p)
Islamic banks should not abandon 
delivering social outcomes because it is 
a part of its founding philosophy
Depositor only 186 251.54 .494
Depositor as well as a borrower 89 239.65
Depositor as well as practitioner 
(manager and staff)
160 262.08
Depositor as well as a Syariah 
adviser
3 322.33
Depositor as well as a regulator 9 260.67
Depositor as well as an academic 15 312.97
Depositor as well as an owner 
(stock holder)
2 261.25
Community (none above) 42 230.80
Total 506
Doing social outcomes will strengthen 
reputation of Islamic Banks
Depositor only 186 247.84 .602
Depositor as well as a borrower 89 243.39
Depositor as well as practitioner 
(manager and staff)
160 264.02
Depositor as well as a Syariah 
adviser
3 144.33
Depositor as well as a regulator 9 289.72
Depositor as well as an academic 15 286.77
Depositor as well as an owner 
(stock holder)
2 215.25
Community (none above) 42 249.92
Total 506
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4.2. Responses on IB’s Social Responsiveness 
The term social responsiveness is measured by using a four-category rating: 
reactive, defensive, accommodative, and proactive (RDAP Scale). This scale was 
introduced by Carroll (1979), Wartick and Cochran (1985), Clarkson (1995), and 
further modified by (Hamidi & Worthington, 2018) as shown in Table 7. 
Table 6.
Kruskal-Wallis tests: Respondents’ Responses on IB’s Social Outcomes (Continued)
Questions Role N Mean 
Rank
Asymp. 
sig. (p)
Islamic banks should show higher 
social results than conventional banks
Depositor only 186 250.68 .322
Depositor as well as a borrower 89 231.13
Depositor as well as practitioner 
(manager and staff)
160 266.63
Depositor as well as a Syariah 
adviser
3 203.83
Depositor as well as a regulator 9 287.67
Depositor as well as an academic 15 309.00
Depositor as well as an owner 
(stock holder)
2 199.50
Community (none above) 42 242.36
Total 506
Table 7.
RDAP Scale for Assessing Social Responsiveness
Achievement (%) Rating Posture or Strategy Performance
0–40 Reactive Deny responsibility Doing less than required
41–50 Defensive Admit responsibility but fight it Doing the least that is required
51–60 Accommodative Accept responsibility Doing all that is required
61–100 Proactive Anticipate responsibility Doing more than is required
When requested to respond about the social responsiveness of IB, the majority 
respondents of survey (42.89%) state that IB is in defensive level (doing the least 
that is required), while few of them (6.92%) suggest even worst that IB is reactive 
point (doing less than required). On the contrary, 34.78% of respondents believe 
that IB is in the accommodative position (doing all that is required) and further 
15.42% of them state that IB is proactive (doing more than is required) in delivering 
social outcomes (Graph 1). 
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If we search into detail in the educational segment, those pinpointing that IB 
is currently in defensive level are supported by participants from more educated 
respondents (7 doctorates, 40 master’s degree holders, 130 bachelor degree 
holders, 19 college diploma holders, and 20 primary school graduates), while 
the supporters of accommodative level is fewer (3 doctorates, 36 master’s degree 
holders, 107 bachelor degree holders, 14, college diploma holders, and 15 primary/
secondary school graduates) (Graph 2). 
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Once we confronted the experts with the results, almost all of them concurred. 
Seven out 10 interviewees responded: five professionals suggested the social 
outcomes of IB were less than expectations, none considers as expected, and two 
were neutral (no positive or negative assessment) as can be depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8.
Experts’ Responses on IB’s Social Responsiveness
Interviewees
Responses 
Total
As expected Neutral
Under 
expectation
R1 0 0 1 1
R2 0 0 1 1
R3 0 1 0 1
R4 0 0 0 0
R5 0 0 1 1
R6 0 0 0 0
R7 0 0 0 0
R8 0 0 1 1
R9 0 0 1 1
R10 0 1 0 1
Total (10) 0 2 5 7
Note: 0 indicates disagree with statement, 1 otherwise
The respondents who agreed that social outcomes of IB are at low level, 
suggest an immediate improvement need to be done. Some illustrative comments 
are as follow:
 “Yes, it is still far, because they only depend on management, it means 
depending on the owner. If the owner does not care, there will be none [social 
activities].” R1
 “It is still far. No money no action. It can be said that Islamic banking today is 
still marginal. In this sense, I have to say that the level of efficiency compared 
to conventional is still lower, why? Because some things are actually sunatullah 
[Law of God]. The sunnatullah suggests the power of number. The larger the 
assets, the more efficient.” R2
 “We have social activities, but only in the form of CSR. However, the number is 
small, only a few billion rupiahs. Small. If we want it to be larger, the question 
is: we have to set up the infrastructure, don’t we?” R10
4.3. Some Approaches to Improve IB’s Social Responsiveness 
While graph 1 demonstrates that almost a half of the respondents (total of defensive 
42.89% and reactive 6.92%), it indicates that the social outcomes resulted from IB 
is not impressive suggesting that there is a need to improve it. There are possible 
approaches to improve as suggested by the scholars including: (1) maximizing 
CSR (Dusuki, 2005), (2) combining CSR with waqf and zakat system (Raimi et al., 
2014), (3) establishing Waqf bank (Mohammad, 2011), (4) establishing ISB trough 
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micro finance or Bait al Maal wat Tamwil or BMT (Hamidi & Worthington, 2017), 
(5) establishing an ISB as new business entity. Among these options, the majority 
of respondents (52.96) prefer scenario number 2, followed by emphasizing CSR 
(25.1%) and BMT (9.09). Only a small number (7.11%) considered the idea of ISB 
is ready (Graph 3). 
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When we scrutinized the first and the second choices, we found that depositors 
as well as regulators and depositors as well as Sharia advisers were in both 
positions, not other choices (Graph 4). Supporters for ISB are from depositors 
only (3.16%), depositors as well as borrowers (1.19%), depositors as well as 
practitioners (1.58%), a depositor as well as a stockholder (0.2%), and community 
(0.59%) (Graph 4).
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As for the scenarios to improve social responsiveness of IB, experts seemed 
to have different point of views or even conflicting. For instance, one respondent 
suggested not to establish a new type of IB since the [Islamic values] of existing 
banks are not fully implemented. In contrast, the need for establishing a new type 
of IB to improve their social outcomes could not be negated.
 “I don’t think it is necessary [to make a new type of bank], because the existing 
banks are not yet implemented, it may not have the same mindset. If you 
finally create another banking, worrying doesn’t mean anything.” R3
 “We have learned, we have been in Indonesia for almost more than 25 years, 
operating in 1992 now in 2017, meaning 25 years. Our market share is still 
5.2% because of the results of the conversion of the BPD Aceh. My question is: 
if a new bank is created again, do we not repeat the same thing as the existing 
one?” R10
 “This Islamic bank has deviated from its khittah (ideal), now the choice is two: 
Islamic banks are usually like this, it can be shifted a little but cannot really 
return to the ideal. Yes, there is a need to establish one more institution that 
can really combine commercial and social.” R1 
The respondents who seemed to agree to the idea of establishing a new kind 
of IB out of the existing one suggested using Baitul Mal wat Tamwil (BMT) or Waqf 
bank. BMT is a type of Islamic micro finance with two different functions. As its 
name implies, Baitul Mal refers to treasure house, dedicated for social mission 
by collecting zakat, infaq, and shadaqah. While Baitut Tamwil (house of wealth 
management) serves for financial intermediation such as saving and financing 
(Hadisumarto & Ismail, 2010). According Aziz (2006) to the initial capital invested 
in BMT is between IDR20-30 million (around US$1,333-2,000). Their opinion and 
their reason are as follows: 
Graph 4. Stakeholders’ Perception on How to Improve Social Outcomes  of IB 
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 “In my opinion, BMT is more visible because it doesn’t need a lot of funds.” R1
 “There has been a discussion about waqf bank. Waqf banks will maximize 
existing social funds.” R8
Although BMT is attractive to be chosen as an alternative body to enhance social 
dimension of IB, however, this institution is not without pejorative image. Some 
suggest avoiding it, as in reality its performance is constantly under questions. 
 “The role of Baitul Mal of BMT is very limited.” R9
 “The problem is the Nazir [manager of waqf] and these Muzaki (who pays 
zakat) are reluctant to go to BMT because BMT has been labeled as a business 
institution. Even though they distribute their zakat through BMT, the amount 
is small. Because, BMT’s business is small, Muzaki is doubtful. Hence, BMT 
receives very little funding for the social goals.” R5
The majority of respondents suggested combining CSR and the zakat–waqf 
system, a finding consistent with those in Dusuki (2008) and Raimi et al. (2014). 
However, while this is theoretically feasible, in practice it may face potentially 
serious legal challenges. 
 “Clearly, the character of CSR and waqf is different. The waqf property must be 
eternal, what we give away is the result of its investment. While CSR runs out, 
not for endowments. If CSR is combined with waqf, will it be a Nazir activity 
or bank activity? It must be clear. Because it is something different, if bank 
activities mean role of Nazir melts, it is gone. If Nazir activities mean that the 
bank is increasingly lost in its social function, because who have the right to 
manage and distribute the investment of the waqf are Nazir.” R9
Regardless of the aforementioned approaches, from the interviewees’ stance, 
they identified at least other seven policies to improve the social outcomes of 
IB (Graph 5). Four of them are relating to zakat (Paying zakat, cooperating with 
BAZNAS, establishing Baitul Mal, and increasing the size of IB). This finding 
affirms that IB provides more social disclosure than those are not subject to zakat 
(Maali et al., 2006). First, it is suggested that IB requires to pay zakat, because 
zakat is one of the main sources of social fund. Second, IB needs to cooperate with 
BAZNAS (the national zakat amil board) to improve the collection of zakat and its 
distribution. Third, IB may separately establish Baitul Mal to focus on managing 
ZIS of within its organization. Fourth, IB needs to constantly increase their sizes, 
because it will increase the amount of zakat being collected. 
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Aside from zakat, two issues need to be settled by regulation body as suggested 
by the experts. First, the implementation of 3P should be an obligatory rather 
than an optional choice. This seems important because it constitutes the second 
largest part of experts’ recommendation after establishment of waqf bank. Second, 
the regulation body should provide incentives to IB in order they easily adopt 
the policies and gradually shift to implement the policies into practices. Another 
remaining option is to establish a finance company. It is considered simpler than 
waqf bank, because it will only manage waqf assets not depositors’ money. 
4.4. Responses to Specific Features of ISB 
Although the supporters of ISB were only around 7% out of 506 respondents; 
however, it should not be neglected, and it is worth investigating. First, from the 
expert views, only few recommended ISB as an option, because the existing IB was 
difficult to be altered. 
 “Yes, there is a need to establish one more institution that can really combine 
commercial and social.” R1 
 “ISB should be from waqf, if it uses this channel, then it can be done. We, then, 
prepare who are the Mauquf ‘alaih (beneficiaries of waqf), then distribute it to 
the beneficiaries.” R6
Graph 5. Experts’ Views on How to Improve Social Outcomes
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Second, in the future, most experts followed suitable finance whereby IB 
should not only focus on its profit or prosperity, but also emphasize on people 
and planet. 
 “So it fits perfectly the idea of sustainable finance with IB. Because the bank is 
a business institution, of course it must be profit, so that from the accounting 
side it must be sustainable. Then it must also have a good impact on the 
community, empowering and no exploitation from one party to another. Then 
the planet must also have a good impact.” R4 
Table 8.
Stakeholders’ Perception on the Characteristics of ISB
Responses Percent of 
CasesN Percent
Frequency ISBa Banking basic 76 11.6 15.5
Ethical project and preserving environment 87 13.3 17.6
Prioritising local people 121 18.5 24.5
Designing an alternative collateral 148 22.6 30.0
Transparency 71 10.9 14.4
Democratic in decision making 22 3.4 4.5
All applies 129 19.7 26.1
654 100.0 132.4%
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1
Third, the respondents consider that the current IB practice might not allow 
productive individuals with limited capital to access bank’s financing. In contrast, 
IB supporters seem to overestimate the willingness of Islamic banks to provide 
long-term financing to support economic growth (Chapra, 1992; Siddiqi, 1983). 
In this regard, they suggest if a new institution is about to establish, this bank 
shall design an alternative collateral (22.6%) (Table 8). This parallels a suggestion 
by San-Jose et al. (2011) to develop an alternative guarantee system that would 
be more accessible for small and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, it should 
operate locally and aim to serve the lower middle class (18.5%), which is consistent 
with Guene and Mayo (2001) and Mohd Nor et al. (2016) and their arguments to 
provide loans for low-income consumers as well as small and micro enterprises. 
Furthermore, this hypothesized bank would not only target profitable projects, 
but also support ethical and environmental projects (13.3%). The respondents 
also indicated to some extent that they were in favor of Islamic banks pursuing 
environmental preservation alongside social banking (Benedikter, 2011; De Clerck, 
2009; Weber, 2014). Certainly, while Islamic values consider the environment as 
having the utmost priority (Abdelzaher, Kotb, & Helfaya, 2019), in practice it is 
also somewhat neglected by Islamic banks (Asutay & Harningtyas, 2015; Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2007). 
In addition, as the bank’s orientation is lower middle class, then it should focus 
its service on providing basic savings and financing facilities (11.6%). This is also 
in line with proponents of social banking that these banks should pay attention 
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to the fulfillment of the basic necessities of life such as consumption, housing, 
transportation, and communication (Reifner, 1992) .
Expert interviews support all these points. Whether we need establishing a 
specific institution or improving social outcomes from the existing IB, their ideal 
features should comprise nine main characteristics (Graph 6), including: (1) 
transparency, (2) designing an alternative system of collateral, (3) emphasizing 
green banking and ethical projects, (4) supporting micro enterprises, (5) 
empowering disadvantaged groups including women and the poor (6) prioritizing 
the agricultural sector, (7) collecting zakat and cash waqf, (8) creating jobs for 
people, and (9) using the internet and branchless banking. 
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Graph 6. Experts’ Views on The Features and Characteristics of ISB
(Hierarchy Chart Based on Nodes)
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1. Conclusion
This paper has discussed main issues regarding social outcomes and the prospect 
of establishment of ISB. Employing a survey and interview with some relevant 
experts and professionals, we highlight important contributions to financial 
sector, regulation, and policy. First, both survey and interview indicate that the 
social outcomes of IB are low (42.89% the respondents consider IB “admitting 
responsibility but fight it” or doing the least that is required, while 6.92% 
of them suggest IB is “denying responsibility” or doing less than required). 
Consequently, further improvement should be made. Second, to improve the 
social responsiveness of IB, the majority of respondents prefer a combination of 
CSR and the ZIS-Waqf system (52.96%), or maximizing the role of CSR (25.1%). 
Third, although theoretically combining CSR and ZIS-Waqf system is feasible, 
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however in the practical sense, it might encounter legal issue as both have different 
characteristics. Fourth, if ISB is an option, then respondents suggest it should 
operate in local areas to cater to disadvantaged groups (women and low-income 
customers). Accordingly, the bank should design an alternative collateral system, 
more transparent, provides financing to both profitable and ethical projects. The 
ISB would be advised to target micro enterprises and finance agricultural segment. 
5.2. Recommendation
We recommend that regulators and practitioners should take actions to improve 
the social outcomes of IB. We also suggest consideration of establishing an ISB 
because it helps support the prospects of sustainable finance. 
As the respondents suggested, delivering social outcomes may strengthen 
the reputation of IB. Besides, they also expect that IB should demonstrate social 
outcomes more than conventional bank. In this regard, we recommend IB 
practitioners seriously address some of the social matters discussed in this paper 
that not only relate to the management of zakat and qarh al-hasan, but also to the 
policy designs that help the underprivileged improve their financial standing. 
Possibilities include, for instance, extending services to rural areas; designing 
alternative collateral systems; and promoting or empowering women. While these 
will incur a cost to a bank, there should be a corresponding gain in reputation. The 
experience of Bank Tabungan Pembangunan Nasional (BTPN) well illustrates the 
point, with the bank maintaining both superior financial and social performance 
after its first financing cycle (BTPNSyariah, 2018). 
According to most respondents, the preferred approach to improving social 
outcomes in IB is through combining CSR and the ZIS-Waqf system. Consequently, 
regulators could review some of the options for legal reform that would suit 
this purpose. Further, although only a small number of respondents supported 
the establishment of an ISB possibly because it is not a well-known alternative 
banking form in Indonesia, we consider it worthy of attention. We also encourage 
the regulator to consider the level of obligation involved in sustainable finance 
given the social contract of IB in Indonesia. In practice, regulators may need to 
provide some incentives to make this policy more attractive. 
Of course, this study has some obvious methodological limitations, including a 
need to extend the findings in more detail. We recommend that future researchers 
consider how we could combine CSR and the ZIS-Waqf system as one of the 
options and whether it would be possible to offer ISB product and services within 
existing IB banks as an alternative to establishing a separate ISB.
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